Martin Partington: Spotlight on the Justice System

Keeping the English Legal System under review

Archive for the ‘Chapter 3’ Category

Keeping up with Brexit

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Whatever your views on the wisdom of the UK leaving the European Union, the process of leaving has started and is due to be completed by March 2019. At least, that is the date by which the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill is due to have completed its Parliamentary process. How long any transition period will be after March 2019 is not yet decided.

There is considerable debate in the media about the whole process with fierce political arguments continuing to rage about the process and what would constitute a desirable outcome.

One thing is crystal clear; the process is not going to be easy. There is a vast amount of detailed technical argument to be had before agreements are reached; and once agreements are reached a vast amount of technical work to translate the terms of those agreements into effective legal force.

It is hard for those interested in what is going on to know where to turn for information. The Government is trying to help by bringing together all the policy, future partnership and other documents it has published which relate to Brexit. A collection of these can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/article-50-and-negotiations-with-the-eu. This list will be continually added to as discussions with the EU progress.

It will be seen that there are many issues in the list of matters to be decided that will affect the English Legal System.

Of course at the moment, these documents represent what the UK Government would like to achieve. Whether it will be successful will depend on the outcome of the negotiations currently in progress.

The process seen from the EU side can be found by going to https://ec.europa.eu/commission/brexit-negotiations_en which sets out materials arising from the negotiations led, for the EU by M Barnier.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Written by lwtmp

October 4, 2017 at 12:07 pm

Employment Tribunal fees: back to the drawing board

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Until the coming into force of the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013,  a claimant could bring and pursue proceedings in an Employment Tribunal (ET) and appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) without paying any fee.
The Order created a somewhat complex fee tariff in which different fees were paid, depending on the type of action being brought before the tribunal. In addition, a fee had to be paid at the start of proceedings, another when the case went to a hearing. Poor claimants who fell below defined income and capital limits could get their fees remitted.
The Government’s objective in imposing the fees were said to be
(i) Financial: to transfer a proportion of the costs of the ETs to users (where they
can afford to pay);
(ii) Behavioural: to encourage people to use alternative services to help resolve
their disputes; and
(iii) Justice: to protect access to justice.getting a better balance between what the taxpayer funds and what the litigant funds.

An official review of the impact of the fee changes, published in January 2017 concluded that, broadly, these objectives had been achieved. (See this blog, February 2017)

The Supreme Court has, however, come to a quite different conclusion. In R (on the application of UNISON) (Appellant) v Lord Chancellor (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 51, the Court concluded unanimously that the Fees Order was ultra vires (that is to say that the Lord Chancellor did not have the power to make the order) and so quashed it.

There are at least three reasons why the judgements in this case are particularly interesting.

First, in most cases where the validity of a Statutory Instrument is challenged in the courts, the argument turns on fairly precise questions of statutory interpretation – were the rule-making powers in an Act of Parliament sufficient to give the relevant Minister the power to make the order being challenged?

In this case a much broader, constitutional approach was adopted. The essence of the argument was that the impact of the Order was so dramatic (the numbers of cases coming to both the ET and the EAT had fallen dramatically since the introduction of the fees) that they had the effect of denying potential claimants access to justice.Lord Reed, in the principal judgement, refers back to a number of historic legal texts, including Magna Carta, to conclude that it is a constitutional principle recognised in common law, that people should have access to justice.

Second, the judgement relies heavily on a number of empirical studies to show that the effect of impact of the fees rules was quite disproportionate. Using hypothetical examples, the Justices conclude that ordinary people on average earnings would have to forgo weeks if not months of expenditure on anything other than the most basic necessities to save the money needed to pay the relevant fees. The Court decided that the fees thus imposed a quite disproportionate burden on those who might have an arguable case to take to the ET or EAT. Certainly the cosy conclusions of the impact review, mentioned at the start of this note, were totally rejected by the Supreme Court

Finally, Lord Reed makes a number of  interesting and important observations about the rule of law and the functions of courts and tribunals in supporting the rule of law. (See in particular paras 66-85 of the judgement). Here I set out brief extracts from the judgement:

The importance of the rule of law is not always understood. Indications of a lack
of understanding include the assumption that the administration of justice is merely a public service like any other, that courts and tribunals are providers of services to
the “users” who appear before them, and that the provision of those services is of
value only to the users themselves and to those who are remunerated for their
participation in the proceedings. [There is an] assumption that the consumption of ET and EAT services without full cost recovery results in a loss to society, since “ET and EAT use does not lead to gains to society that exceed the sum of the gains to
consumers and producers of these services”.
[However] …the idea that bringing a claim before a court or a tribunal is a purely private activity, and the related idea that such claims provide no broader social benefit, are demonstrably untenable….
Courts exist in order to ensure that the laws made by Parliament, and the common law created by the courts themselves, are applied and enforced. That role includes ensuring that the executive branch of government carries out its functions in accordance with the law. In order for the courts to perform that role, people must in principle have unimpeded access to them. Without such access, laws are liable to become a dead letter, the work done by Parliament may be rendered nugatory, and the democratic election of Members of Parliament may become a meaningless charade. That is why the courts do not merely provide a public service like any other.
Every day in the courts and tribunals of this country, the names of people who brought cases in the past live on as shorthand for the legal rules and principles which their cases established. Their cases form the basis of the advice given to those whose cases are now before the courts, or who need to be advised as to the basis on which their claim might fairly be settled, or who need to be advised that their case is hopeless. The written case lodged on behalf of the Lord Chancellor in this appeal itself cites over 60 cases, each of which bears the name of the individual involved, and each of which is relied on as establishing a legal proposition. The Lord Chancellor’s own use of these materials refutes the idea that taxpayers derive no benefit from the cases brought by other people….
But the value to society of the right of access to the courts is not confined to cases in which the courts decide questions of general importance. People and businesses need to know, on the one hand, that they will be able to enforce their rights if they have to do so, and, on the other hand, that if they fail to meet their obligations, there is likely to be a remedy against them. It is that knowledge which underpins everyday economic and social relations….
When Parliament passes laws creating employment rights, for example, it does so not merely in order to confer benefits on individual employees, but because it has decided that it is in the public interest that those rights should be given effect. It does not envisage that every case of a breach of those rights will result in a claim before an ET. But the possibility of claims being brought by employees whose rights are infringed must exist, if employment relationships are to be based on respect for those rights. Equally, although it is often desirable that claims arising out of alleged
breaches of employment rights should be resolved by negotiation or mediation,
those procedures can only work fairly and properly if they are backed up by the
knowledge on both sides that a fair and just system of adjudication will be available
if they fail. Otherwise, the party in the stronger bargaining position will always prevail….
The Justices accepted that a system of fees that had the objectives set out above – of reducing the cost to the tax payer, encouraging settlement and deterring weak cases – were quite lawful. But they concluded that in this case the fees structure had gone too far. In addition they noted that the practical outcome of the fees imposed by the order was to result in a significant reduction in the money being paid into the system by parties to proceedings. In short, the price for access being charged was too high for the Government to be able to achieve its principal objective of increasing revenue into the court/tribunal system.
It seems clear to me that the Government will not abandon its fees policy – either in relation to ETs and EATs, or indeed to other parts of the courts and tribunals system where fees are imposed. But those devising future schemes will have to take into account considerations that go well beyond those that were initially taken into accounts by Ministers and their civil servant advisers.
The full text of the judgement is at https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2015-0233-judgment.pdf
The press summary is at https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2015-0233-press-summary.pdf

Queen’s Speech 2017 and the Parliamentary session: 2017-2019

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The  draft legislation relating to the exit of the UK from the European Union is going to be extremely complicated – both in terms of the technical content of the proposed measures, and in terms of the political controversies that the legislation will attract, arising from the fact that Mrs May is leading a minority Government in the House of Commons and that there is a great deal of opposition to Brexit in the House of Lords.

The Government has therefore decided that, exceptionally, the current Parliament should last for two years rather than more normal one. Thus the next Queens Speech, following that  delivered in June 2017, will not be made until May 2019.

In addition to the raft of measures required to deal with different aspect of Brexit, the 2017 speech contained annoucements about two measures that will have specific impact on the English legal system.

  1. “Legislation will  be introduced to modernise the courts system and to help reduce motor insurance premiums.” This will not actually be wholly new. The measures relating to court reform and insurance premiums were originally contained in the Prisons and Courts Bill 2017, which fell when the 2017 General Election was called. The revised version of the new Bill has not yet been published but may be anticipated in Autumn 2017.
  2. “To support victims, my government will take forward measures to introduce an independent public advocate, who will act for bereaved families after a public disaster and support them at public inquests.” This is a reform that has long been called for. The details of this measure are not yet available.The Queen’s speech may be read at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2017

 

 

 

 

 

Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 and the General Election 2017

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There were those who thought that the enactment of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 meant that there would be general elections only every 5 years, unless very special circumstances arose. Enacted by the Cameron-Clegg  government, it was designed to give some assurance that the Coalition Government would stay in power and would not be able to call a general election just on the whim of the Prime Minister.

What few people appreciated, however, was that the terms of the legislation did not in fact prevent the Prime Minister – now Theresa May – from putting in process the steps that would enable her to call an election, at a time when she was seeking to strengthen her position as Prime Minister, given her apparent strong position in the opinion polls. All she needed was a vote passed by a 2/3rds majority of MPs to trigger an early election.

As we now know, things did not work out like that. Her gamble did not pay off – at least not in the way she anticipated. So where are we with the Fixed-term Parliaments Act?

It remains on the statute book, and there are some who think that there will be a General Election – under the terms of the Act – in 2022. Political reality suggests, however, that the next election will take place before then. Exactly when will depend on specific factors such as  strength of the Prime Minister’s position,  and the progress of the Brexit negotiations.

I would not be surprised if, at some date in the not too distant future, steps were taken to repeal the legislation – unless perhaps there is another period of Coalition Government in the UK.

Written by lwtmp

July 8, 2017 at 3:19 pm

Determining the limits of Executive Power: the Miller case

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There is no doubt that 24 January 2017 was a big day for the Supreme Court. That was the date on which 11 Justices handed down their decision in R (on the application of Miller and another)  v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
At issue was a fundamental constitutional question: could the decision of the UK to exit the European Union be implemented by the Government itself exercising executive power deriving from the Royal Prerogative, or did the process have to be authorised by Parliament passing a Bill which would give the Government the power to start the exit process.
The Government argued – in outline – that the power of the UK Government to enter into international treaty obligations is something that is exercised by exercise of prerogative powers. Thus, equally the Government argued – the power to disengage from treaty obligations could be done by exercise of those same prerogative powers.
Those who challenged the Government’s position argued that because accessing the EU had been accompanied by the enactment of the European Communities Act 1972, (which gave domestic effect to the UK’s obligations under the then existing EU Treaties, together with subsequent statutes, which gave effect to and related to later EU Treaties, and the European Union Referendum Act 2015) the Act of 1972 had created legal rights and obligations in our domestic law. Owing to the well-established rule that prerogative powers may not extend to acts which result in a change to UK domestic law, and withdrawal from the EU Treaties would change domestic law, the Government cannot serve a Notice unless first authorised to do so by an Act of Parliament.
By a majority of 8 – 3, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court that the process of starting Brexit could not be started by the exercise of the prerogative, but must be authorised by an Act of Parliament.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the 2016 referendum was an event of great political significance. However, its legal significance had to determined by what Parliament included in the statute authorising it, and that statute simply provided for the referendum to be held without specifying the consequences.
The change in the law required to implement the referendum’s outcome must be made in the only way permitted by the UK constitution, namely by legislation.
There has been a great deal of comment – much of it vitriolic and ill-informed – on the decisions of the courts. Those who argued in favour of the Government appeared to have forgotten some basic constitutional principles.
  • The Sovereignty of Parliament means that Parliament ( not the Executive) has the power to make and unmake laws (indeed that was a key argument of the case for Brexit – that the UK had ceded too much law making power from the UK Parliament to the EU).
  • The Separation of Powers means that there are checks and balances in our constitutional settlement, which implies that the judiciary must have the independence to reach decisions that the Government of the day may not like.

It can be argued that the Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor was too slow to acknowledge her obligations under section 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to uphold the continued independence of the judiciary – certainly in the immediate aftermath of the initial High Court decision in which considerable abuse was heaped upon the judges in the Press. Those who accused the judges of ‘being out of touch’ showed that they had no understanding of what the role of the judges is and should be in a parliamentary democracy.

Of course, those in power who find that they are prevented from doing what they would like may be expected to rail against those who have put barriers in their way – recent events in the USA bear witness to this proposition. But it should be remembered that without checks and balances, government leaders may well be tempted to take more and more power to themselves, with potentially extremely serious consequences for the people they seek to govern.

One further question that this case provokes is whether the current mix of constitutional principle – the precise limits of which are unclear – and law is the mot appropriate basis on which the Constitution of the UK should be founded. Is one implication of the Miller case that the time has now come for the UK to adopt a written constitution?

Written by lwtmp

February 27, 2017 at 10:08 am

Setting limits to the exercise of prerogative powers: R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union

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One of the most important legal challenges to the exercise of prerogative power has recently been made in the case of  R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. This is the case that challenged the Government’s view that it could trigger Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union without the necessity for a vote in Parliament. This is a case of very considerable constitutional importance. I provide here links to a  summary of the case, and  to the whole judgement.

The decision of the Administrative Court is being appealed go the Supreme Court. The outcome of that hearing is expected early in 2017.

A summary of the decision can be found by clicking on the following link:

 

The full judgement is at

While it was accepted that the Government can use its prerogative power to enter international treaties, in the case of the European Union, the relationship between the UK and the EU was underpinned by the European Communities Act 1972, which had been enacted by the UK Parliament. The judges accepted that, if the UK were to exit the EU, this would inevitably result in rights and obligations brought into the UK’s domestic law by the Act of 1972 being altered.

The judges held that the Sovereignty of Parliament was the most important  principle in the UK’s constitutional arrangements. While the Parliament could make or unmake any law, it was not permissible to use prerogative powers to change law enacted by Parliament. Thus, in the current situation, it was not permissible to use  prerogative power to trigger the start of the process of leaving the EU.

Sections of the UK Press saw this decision as undermining the will of the people (as expressed in the result of the referendum on leaving the EU). However, a more sensible view is that in this decision the Court was deciding  that the fundamental principle of the Sovereignty of Parliament should be upheld and that it was the proper function of the Court – which is independent of Government – to rule that in these circumstances the Sovereignty of Parliament was not to be undermined by the use of prerogative power.

 

 

 

Written by lwtmp

November 6, 2016 at 8:21 am

Outcome of the EU Referendum

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So, we now know the outcome of the vote on whether or not the UK should leave the EU. Clearly, over coming months and years, there will be considerable ramifications for the English Legal System. In particular the chapter in my book (chapter 3) on law making will – eventually – need considerable amendment. I will endeavour to keep an eye on developments as they occur. I do not intend to get drawn into essentially political speculation about what may or may not happen.

While the result has been welcomed by many, it has come as a shock to many others. I note that a Petition proposing a further referendum has already been proposed.

See https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/131215

Written by lwtmp

June 24, 2016 at 2:47 pm

Posted in Chapter 3

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