Posts Tagged ‘supreme court’
Repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act: draft Bill published
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was enacted as part of the agreement reached between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Parties, when, in 2010, they formed the coalition government led by David Cameron. The idea of fixed-term parliaments had been around for many years. The problem has been that when a political party becomes a government, statutorily fixed-terms reduce the freedom Prime Ministers have long had to decide when they wanted to call an election would be constrained. Those in power have been reluctant to give up this freedom. (There is of course an overall limit – that an election much be called at least every 5 years.)
In 2011, the creation of the Coalition Government changed the political landscape. It was felt that, without setting a timetable for elections, there could be considerabe political instability if the majority partner in the coalition had the freedom to call an election when the opinion polls looked favourable, which could potentiallyhave left the minority in the lurch. The General Election 2015 was conducted within the framework laid down in the 2011 Act.
In 2017, the statutory framework was shown to be considerably less rigid than the title of the Act might have suggested. Mrs May, who had become Prime Minister in 2016, following the Brexit Referendum, thought good polling figures would give her a chance of establishing a more stable Government than that which followed the 2015 election. She was able to hold an election in 2017 because the Act provided that, where the House of Commons voted by a 2/3rd majority in favour of holding an early General Election. The political circumstances at the time enabled her to achieve that result.
In 2019, as the Brexit negotiations were drawing to a close, the Government – now led by Boris Johnson – wanted to find a way of ensuring that it could get a Brexit agreement through the Parliament. The Parliament was so divided on the issue that three attempts to get Parliamentary approval of a draft agreement failed. Mr Johnson thought that one way out of this difficulty would be to be to hold a general election which, if he won, would put the Brexit Agreement at the heart of Government policy. However, he could not do this because the statutory conditions for getting around the Fixed-term Parliaments Act timetable were not met. He did not have a 2/3rd majority in favour of holding a General Election (the route used by Mrs May) nor had he lost a vote of confidence which could also have triggered the calling of an early General Election.
Instead, he tried to prorogue Parliament – bringing one session to an end and starting a new session. But his purported use of the prerogative power to prorogue, which would have resulted in Parliament being totally shut down for 5 weeks, was ruled to be unlawful by the Supreme Court. (See R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant) v The Prime Minister (Respondent) [2019] UKSC 41.) He finally achieved his goal by getting Parliament to sidestep the Act through the enactment of the Early Parliamentary General Election Act 2019.
One item in the Conservative Party’s election manifesto for the 2019 General Election was that, if elected, a Conservative Government would repeal the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. In December 2020 the Draft Fixed Term Parliaments Act (Repeal) Bill was published.
In fact, the Fixed Term Parliaments Act contained a built-in mechanism for its own review. Section 7, added during its parliamentary passage in 2011, provided that between June and November 2020 the Prime Minister should arrange for a committee to review the operation of the Act. That committee was established in November 2020, with 14 MPs and six members of the House of Lords. It is this Committee, chaired by former Conservative Chief Whip Lord (Patrick) McLoughlin, that is now considering the draft Bill.
Two parliamentary committees had already reviewed the operation of the FTPA: the Lords Constitution Committee (2019), and the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (2020). Both raised important questions of principle about the whole idea of creating fixed-term parliaments. Was it right, in principle, that a Prime Minister should have the prerogative power be able to choose an election date? Why should general elections not be held within a timetable agreed by Parliament? The policy arguments in favour of fixed term parliaments as well made in an article by Robert Hazell from the Constitution Unit.
One feature of the draft Bill is that it includes provisions designed to prevent the courts from intervening in any decision taken by a Prime Minister to call an election. Two public lawyers, Professor Elliott and Professor Young, have given their views on the Bill including a consideration of whether the Bill’s attempt to restore the Executive’s prerogative power to determine the date for an election also mean that the potential for a challenge in the courts that an exercise of that power has been unreasonable can be eliminated.
Although the repeal of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act might at first sight seem like a rather narrow issue, it does raise important policy and legal issues which must be considered both while the current Bill is in draft form, and after any legislation has been enacted.
For further information, see the following articles:
By Robert Hazell at https://constitution-unit.com/2020/12/11/the-fixed-term-parliaments-act-should-it-be-amended-or-repealed/
By Professor Elliott at https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2020/12/02/repealing-the-fixed-term-parliaments-act/
By Professor Young at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2020/12/04/alison-l-young-the-draft-fixed-term-parliaments-act-2011-repeal-bill-turning-back-the-clock/
Independent Review of Administrative Law
In an earlier blog (13 July 2020), I noted the House of Lords Library paper on the proposed Constitution, Rights and Democracy Commission, an idea contained in the Conservative Party manifesto for the 2019 General Election.
Although no further steps towards the creation of the Commission have been announced, at the end of July 2020 the Government announced that it was establishing an independent review of administrative law to look in particular at judicial review – the power of the courts to review and where necessary overturn a decision made by Goverment.
Governments frequently complain that the use of judicial review can prevent them from taking decisions they think are necessary. Defenders of judicial review argue that the principle of the rule of law demands that executive/administrative actions can only be taken if they are authorised by law.
The Independent Review, chaired by Sir Edward Faulks QC, a former Minister of State for Civil Justice, has been asked to examine a number of questions relating to judicial review.
The Terms of Reference for the Review state that the Review should
- examine trends in judicial review of executive action, in particular in relation to the policies and decision making of the Government;
- bear in mind how the legitimate interest in the citizen being able to challenge the lawfulness of executive action through the courts can be properly balanced with the role of the executive to govern effectively under the law;
- consider data and evidence on the development of JR and of judicial decision-making and consider what (if any) options for reforms might be justified.
More specifically the review has to consider:
1. Whether the amenability of public law decisions to judicial review by the courts and the grounds of public law illegality (an area of law developed by the judges) should be codified in statute;
2. Whether the legal principle of non-justiciability (i.e. that certain types of decision cannot be reviews in the courts) requires clarification and, if so, the identity of subjects/areas where the issue of the justiciability/non-justiciability of the exercise of a public law power and/or function could be considered by the Government;
3. Whether, where the exercise of a public law power should be justiciable: (i) on which grounds the courts should be able to find a decision to be unlawful; (ii) whether those grounds should depend on the nature and subject matter of the power and (iii) the remedies available in respect of the various grounds on which a decision may be declared unlawful; and
4. Whether procedural reforms to judicial review are necessary, in general to “streamline the process”, and, in particular: (a) on the burden and effect of disclosure in particular in relation to “policy decisions” in Government; (b) in relation to the duty of candour, particularly as it affects Government; (c) on possible amendments to the law of standing – i.e. deciding who can bring an action by way of judicial review; (d) on time limits for bringing claims, (e) on the principles on which relief is granted in claims for judicial review, (f) on rights of appeal, including on the issue of permission to bring JR proceedings and; (g) on costs and interveners (the ability of bodies not parties to an action to intervene in the action by providing specialist advice or assistance).
The Review has been asked to report by the end of 2020. Recommendations will be considered by the Lord Chancellor and the Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancashire, Michael Gove.
Although the announcement does not state this, the creation of this panel is, at least in part, a result of the decision of the Supreme Court in R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant) v The Prime Minister (Respondent) [2019] UKSC 41. The issues in the case were noted in this blog on 24 September 2019. Although it was argued that the Prime Minister’s use of the prerogative to prorogue Parliament (i.e. bring a Parliament to an end prior to the holding of a General Election) was non-justiciable – i.e. it could be reviewed by the Court, the Supreme Court rejected this argument and found exercise of the power was justiciable. Further, there the effect of the Prime Minister’s decision was to prevent all Parliamentary activity for 5 weeks, this was far more than necessary to prepare for a General Election and so went beyond the scope of his prerogative power and was unlawful.
The announcement of the review and links to the Terms of Reference are at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-launches-independent-panel-to-look-at-judicial-review
The Supreme Court decision in the Miller case is at https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2019-0192.html
Proposed Constitution, Democracy and Rights Commission
One proposal that caught the eye in the Conservative Party’s manifesto for the December 2019 general election was that, following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, it would be necessary to look at “broader aspects” of the UK’s constitution. The idea was that a constitution, democracy, and rights commission should be established to examine the following issues:
- the relationship between the government, parliament, and the courts;
- the functioning of the royal prerogative;
- the role of the House of Lords; and
- access to justice for ordinary people.
Other areas would include examining judicial review and amending the Human Rights Act 1998 to balance the rights of individuals, national security, and effective government.
The Government has said that it wants to ensure a range of expertise is represented on the commission. It also wants the commission to evidence from third parties and civic society to inform any recommendations. However, there are currently limited details available on the remit, form, and composition of the commission.
Several commentators and academics have welcomed the general principle of reviewing the UK’s constitutional arrangements. However, some have expressed concern about the context of the commission, particularly coming after the Supreme Court found against the Government on constitutional issues.
Those interested in starting to think about the issues which the Commission, once established, might consider will find the Research Briefing paper, written by Charley Coleman from the House of Lords Library and published in late March 2020, to be an excellent introduction.
The briefing can be found at https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/lln-2020-0089/
Amending the doctrine of precedent? Proposals to permit departure from EU case law
In 1966, the Supreme Court (then the House of Lords) issued a Practice Direction which asserted its authority to depart, in exceptional circumstances, from an earlier decision and thereby change what was regarded as settled law.
Occasions on which this power has been used have been rare. Between the publication of the Practice Direction in 1966 and the abolition of the House of Lords in 2009, the power was used around 25 times. And its use has been similarly restrained by the Supreme Court.
One specific context in which there can be pressure to override a precedent arises where a judgement from the European Court of Justice (or indeed the European Court of Human Rights) is incompatible with UK law.
A question which arises from the departure of the UK from the European Union is how, after the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020, UK courts should deal with cases from the European Court of Justice which will remain effective in the UK (technically known as ‘retained case law’).
The Government has announced a consultation on whether the principle that only the Supreme Court (and the High Court of Judiciary in Scotland) should have this power, or whether other courts should be given the same authority.
The Government’s preliminary view, on which the opinions of consultees are sought, is that the powers should be extended to either:
- The Court of Appeal of England and Wales, the Inner Court of Session in Scotland, the Court of Appeal Northern Ireland and equivalent level courts throughout the UK; or
- those courts plus the High Court of England and Wales, the Outer House of the Court of Session in Scotland, The Sheriff Appeal Court in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary, and the High Court in Northern Ireland.
This raises an interesting possibility. Many years ago, the late Lord Denning argued that the Court of Appeal should have power to depart from its earlier decisions. He felt that because all the important cases went to the Court of Appeal it would be more efficient is they had the authority to make clearly needed changes to precedent, without the expense and delay of a further hearing in the Supreme Court. This view found no general support at the time.
However, if either of the Government’s options in the present consultation is taken forward, might this not lead to a revival of the views Lord Denning, which in turn could generate a somewhat wider argument about the powers of courts other than the Supreme Court to change binding precedent?
The consultation is at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/consultation-launched-on-post-eu-reforms-for-british-courts
A big day in the Supreme Court: R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant) v The Prime Minister (Respondent)
Major cases raising fundamental constitutional issues are rare, which is why 24 Sept 2019 is a significant day. The supreme court ruled that the Prime Minister’s decision to prorogue Parliament for 5 weeks was unlawful.
For the Prime Minister, it was argued, in essence, that the prorogation of Parliament is an act which falls within the scope of the Prerogative (acts formerly taken by the monarch in person, now taken by Ministers). As an essentially political decision, it should not be capable of review by a court – in the technical language it was not ‘justiciable’.
The Supreme Court – sitting with 11 justices – ruled unanimously that it was possible for the courts to judicially review the exercise of prerogative power – to determine whether such exercise fell within the accepted boundaries for the use of such powers. In short, the review of the power to prorogue was a justiciable matter.
That alone did not mean that the Government had acted unlawfully. Prorogation is an important part of the Parliamentary calendar. It brings one Parliamentary session to a close. Ministers then prepare a Queen’s Speech which sets out the Government’s legislative priorities for the coming 12 months. Members of the Supreme Court accepted that a prorogation for a short period was necessary, even though Parliament could not function during that period.
However, the justices accepted evidence (including evidence from the former Prime Minister Sir John Major) that in recent years prorogations tended to be for between 4 and 6 days. That was the average amount of time needed to sort out the Queen’s Speech.
The key point about a prorogation is that it brings all the work that can be carried on in Parliament to a complete standstill. No Committees can work, no Parliamentary Questions can be answered. Prorogation is distinct from recess when Parliament does not sit (e.g. in holiday periods) but other Parliamentary business does continue.
Employment Tribunals fees: payback scheme
In R (on the application of UNISON) (Appellant) v Lord Chancellor (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 51 (noted in this blog on 1 October 2017) the Supreme Court held that the fees being charged for taking cases to Employment Tribunals were so high that they were effectively barring access to justice. In consequence the Court ruled that the fee scheme was unlawful. The Government has now announced arrangements for the refunding of those fees. Stage 1 of the refund scheme became operative on 20 October 2017.
It is clear that the Government plan to introduce a revised scheme which they hope will meet the Supreme Court’s objections.
For the announcement see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/opening-stage-of-employment-tribunal-fee-refund-scheme-launched
Determining the limits of Executive Power: the Miller case
- The Sovereignty of Parliament means that Parliament ( not the Executive) has the power to make and unmake laws (indeed that was a key argument of the case for Brexit – that the UK had ceded too much law making power from the UK Parliament to the EU).
- The Separation of Powers means that there are checks and balances in our constitutional settlement, which implies that the judiciary must have the independence to reach decisions that the Government of the day may not like.
It can be argued that the Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor was too slow to acknowledge her obligations under section 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to uphold the continued independence of the judiciary – certainly in the immediate aftermath of the initial High Court decision in which considerable abuse was heaped upon the judges in the Press. Those who accused the judges of ‘being out of touch’ showed that they had no understanding of what the role of the judges is and should be in a parliamentary democracy.
Of course, those in power who find that they are prevented from doing what they would like may be expected to rail against those who have put barriers in their way – recent events in the USA bear witness to this proposition. But it should be remembered that without checks and balances, government leaders may well be tempted to take more and more power to themselves, with potentially extremely serious consequences for the people they seek to govern.
One further question that this case provokes is whether the current mix of constitutional principle – the precise limits of which are unclear – and law is the mot appropriate basis on which the Constitution of the UK should be founded. Is one implication of the Miller case that the time has now come for the UK to adopt a written constitution?
Martin Partington: Introduction to the English Legal System 15th ed 2021
Oxford University Press Learning Link Resources
Martin Partington: Spotlight on the Justice System 