Martin Partington: Spotlight on the Justice System

Keeping the English Legal System under review

Posts Tagged ‘independence of the judiciary

New Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice: David Lidington MP

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Following the outcome of the General Election in 2017, the period of office of the first female Lord Chancellor, Lynne Truss MP, was brought to an end.

This was widely predicted, as there was a widely held opinion, especially among lawyers and the judiciary, that she had failed to gain the confidence of the legal profession. In particular, her failure to intervene to protect the independence of the judiciary when sections of the mass media attacked senior judges for upholding the argument that parliamentary authority was required before the formal process of the UK leaving the EU could begin, was seen as a lack of understanding of the Lord Chancellor’s obligations to protect the independence of th judiciary, set out in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Lord Thomas, the current Lord Chief Justice, was particularly critical of this.

Truss’ replacement is David Lidington MP. He is another post holder who has no experience of the law. Under section 2 of the Constitutional Reform Act, non-lawyers must nevertheless be ‘qualified by experience’. What this phrase means in practice is proving hard to determine. Presumably the post holder should be someone who understands and is willing to uphold the independence of the judiciary – even where such independence may lead to decisions unwelcome to the Government of the day.

At present it is impossible to say whether the new appointee will turn out to be a more satisfactory appointment than his predecessor, though his previous experience as a Foreign Office Minister suggests that he may have a particular understanding of the importance of upholding the rule of law, and the function of the judiciary is the process.

For comments of the Lord Chief Justice to the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords see http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/constitution-committee/lord-chief-justice/oral/49312.pdf

For the Lord Chancellor’s speech at his swearing-in ceremony, see https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/lord-chancellor-swearing-in-speech-david-lidington

 

 

 

 

 

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Written by lwtmp

July 8, 2017 at 2:44 pm

Transforming the Justice System: the Prisons and Courts Bill 2017

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Enromous changes to the ways in which courts – both criminal and civil – and tribunals operate have already been foreshadowed in a number of policy documents published during 2016. Parts 2 to 4 of the Prisons and Courts Bill contain provisions that will give statutory authority to the changes that have been proposed.

The headline provisions may be set out as follows:

Part 2 creates new procedures in civil, family, tribunal and criminal matters.

It makes changes to court procedures in the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts to make processes and case management more efficient.

It allows some offenders charged with summary-only, non-imprisonable offences to be convicted and given standard penalties using a new online procedure.

It extends the use of live audio and video links, and ‘virtual’ hearings where no parties are present in the court room but attend by telephone or video conferencing facilities.

It makes provision which will apply across the civil, criminal and tribunal jurisdictions to ensure public participation in proceedings which are heard virtually (by the streaming of hearings), including the creation of new criminal offences to guard against abuse, for example by recording such stramed hearings.

It creates a new online procedure rules committee that will be able to create new online procedure rules in relation to the civil, tribunal and family jurisdictions.

It bans cross-examination of vulnerable witnesses  – in particular those who have been the subject of domestic abuse – in certain family cases.

It confers the power to make procedure rules for employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal on the Tribunal Procedure Committee and extends the membership of the Committee to include an employment law practitioner and judge or non-legal member.

 

Part 3 contains measures relating to the organisation and functions of courts and tribunals.

It extends the role of court and tribunal staff authorised to exercise judicial functions giving the relevant procedure rules committees the power to authorise functions in their respective jurisdictions.

It abolishes local justice areas, enabling magistrates to be appointed on a national basis, not just to a specific local justice area.

It replaces statutory declarations with statements of truth in certain traffic and air quality enforcement proceedings.

It makes reforms to the arrangements for the composition of employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

It enables the High Court to make attachment of earnings orders for the recovery of money due under a judgment debt, as far as practicable, on the same basis as in the County Court.

Part 4 contains measures relating to the judiciary and the Judicial Appointments Commission.

It enables more flexible deployment of judges by enabling them to sit in different jurisdictions.

It brings the arrangements for the remuneration of judges and members of employment tribunals – currently undertaken by the Secretary of State for Employment – under the remit of the Lord Chancellor.

It rationlises the roles of  judges in leadership positions who will support a reformed courts and tribunals system. (This includes provision to abolish the statutory post of Justice Clerk; this role will continue, but those qualified to be Clerks will also be able to undertake analogous work in other court/tribunal contexts.)

It  gives the Judicial Appointments Commission the power to carry out more work (not directly related to judicials appointments) on a cost-recovery basis.

Source, Explanatory Notes to the Prisons and Courts Bill 2017, available at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2016-2017/0145/en/17145en02.htm

Setting limits to the exercise of prerogative powers: R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union

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One of the most important legal challenges to the exercise of prerogative power has recently been made in the case of  R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. This is the case that challenged the Government’s view that it could trigger Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union without the necessity for a vote in Parliament. This is a case of very considerable constitutional importance. I provide here links to a  summary of the case, and  to the whole judgement.

The decision of the Administrative Court is being appealed go the Supreme Court. The outcome of that hearing is expected early in 2017.

A summary of the decision can be found by clicking on the following link:

 

The full judgement is at

While it was accepted that the Government can use its prerogative power to enter international treaties, in the case of the European Union, the relationship between the UK and the EU was underpinned by the European Communities Act 1972, which had been enacted by the UK Parliament. The judges accepted that, if the UK were to exit the EU, this would inevitably result in rights and obligations brought into the UK’s domestic law by the Act of 1972 being altered.

The judges held that the Sovereignty of Parliament was the most important  principle in the UK’s constitutional arrangements. While the Parliament could make or unmake any law, it was not permissible to use prerogative powers to change law enacted by Parliament. Thus, in the current situation, it was not permissible to use  prerogative power to trigger the start of the process of leaving the EU.

Sections of the UK Press saw this decision as undermining the will of the people (as expressed in the result of the referendum on leaving the EU). However, a more sensible view is that in this decision the Court was deciding  that the fundamental principle of the Sovereignty of Parliament should be upheld and that it was the proper function of the Court – which is independent of Government – to rule that in these circumstances the Sovereignty of Parliament was not to be undermined by the use of prerogative power.

 

 

 

Written by lwtmp

November 6, 2016 at 8:21 am